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Abstract
Modal logics of strategic ability form one of the fields where logic and game the-
ory can successfully meet. This paper reports research in progress on ATOL, a
logic designed to capture strategic properties of agents under incomplete informa-
tion. The notation and terminology, chosen originally for ATOL, were rather un-
fortunate. Moreover, ATOL needs a large number of modal operators in order to
express properties of agents. We rewrite the syntax and semantics of ATOL, using
an easier-to-read notation, and more natural terminology. More importantly, we
propose an alternative “take” on ATOL, in which simple cooperation modalities can
be combined with epistemic operators into sufficiently expressive formulae. This
new version of ATOL is no less expressive than the older version, while retaining
the same complexity of model checking.
1 Introduction
Modal logics of strategic ability [1, 3, 14, 15] form one of the fields where logic and
game theory can successfully meet. The logics have clear possible worlds semantics,
are axiomatizable, and have some interesting computational properties. Moreover, they
are underpinned by a clear and intuitively appealing conceptual machinery for model-
ing and reasoning about systems that involve multiple autonomous agents. The basic
notions, used here, originate from temporal logic (i.e., the logic of time), and classi-
cal game theory [23, 12, 13], which emerged in an attempt to give precise meaning to
common-sense notions like choices, strategies, or rationality – and to provide formal
models of interaction between autonomous entities, that could be used in further study.
Thus, the notions and models were meant to describe real-life phenomena that occur in
communities of individual and collective agents (e.g., companies). Of course, the treat-
ment of interaction, given by von Neumann, Morgenstern and Nash, is oversimplistic,
and its fundamental philosophical merit has also been questioned.1 One may even ar-
1Consider this quote from [19]: “Rational Behavior [is]: greed, modified by sloth, constrained by formless
fear and justified ex post by rationalization.”
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gue whether modeling of intelligent agents and their interaction can be done with the
tools of mathematics and formal logic at all [24, 16]. However, having a formal model
of a problem makes one realize many (otherwise implicit) assumptions underlying his
or her approach to this problem. Modal logics that embody basic game theory notions
– and at the same time build upon branching-time temporal logics, well known and
studied in the context of computational systems – seem a good starting point for inves-
tigating multi-agent systems. Therefore we begin our paper with a short presentation of
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [1, 2, 3], probably the most important logic of
strategic ability that has emerged in the recent years.
As ATL addresses games in which agents possess perfect information about the cur-
rent state of the game, an extension of ATL, called Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic
Logic (ATEL), was introduced in [20, 21] in order to enable reasoning about agents act-
ing under incomplete information. ATEL adds to ATL the vocabulary of epistemic logic;
still, in ATEL the strategic and epistemic layers are combined as if they were indepen-
dent. They are – if we do not ask whether the agents in question are able to identify and
execute their strategies. They are not if we want to interpret strategies as executable
plans, about which the agents know that they guarantee achieving the goal. This issue
was first addressed in [7], and investigated in detail in [8]; we give a short summary
here in Section 3.
Several updates of ATEL have been proposed to overcome the problem: Alternating-
time Temporal Observational Logic (ATOL) and ATEL with Recall (ATEL-R*) in [8], the
ATEL version from [9], and Epistemic Temporal Strategic Logic in [22]. In this paper,
we focus on ATOL, a logic proposed and discussed by us in [8].
2 ATL: Strategic Ability in Perfect Information Games
ATL [1, 2, 3] was invented to capture properties of open computer systems (such as com-
puter networks), where different components can act autonomously, and computations
in such systems are effected by their combined actions. Alternatively, ATL can be seen
as a logic for systems involving multiple agents, that allows one to reason about what
agents can achieve in game-like scenarios. ATL can be understood as a generalization
of the well-known branching time temporal logic CTL [4], in which path quantifiers are
replaced by so called cooperation modalities. Formula 〈〈A〉〉ϕ, where A is a coalition
of agents, expresses that A have a collective strategy to enforce ϕ. ATL formulae in-
clude temporal operators: “ g” (“in the next state”), 2 (“always from now on”) and U
(“until”).2 Like in CTL, every occurrence of a temporal operator is preceded by exactly
one cooperation modality.
A number of different semantics and model classes has been defined for ATL, most
of them equivalent (cf. [5, 6]). In this paper, we use a variant of concurrent game
structures, which includes a nonempty finite set of all agents Agt = {a1, ..., ak}, a
2Additional operator 3 (“now or sometime in the future”) can be defined as 3ϕ ≡ >Uϕ.
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nonempty set of states Q, a set of atomic propositions Π, a valuation of propositions
pi : Π → P(Q), and the set of (atomic) actions Act. Function d : Agt × Q →
P(Act) defines actions available to an agent in a state, and o is the (deterministic)
transition function that assigns the outcome state q′ = o(q, α1, . . . , αk) to state q and
a tuple of actions 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 that can be executed by Agt in q. A strategy of agent
a is a conditional plan that specifies what a is going to do for every possible game
history. A collective strategy for a group of agents A is simply a tuple of strategies,
one per each agent from A. A path in M is an infinite sequence of states that can
be effected by subsequent transitions, and refers to a possible course of action (or a
possible computation) that may occur in the system. Let λ[i] denote the ith position on
path λ. Now:
M, q  〈〈A〉〉 gϕ iff there is a collective strategy SA such that, for every path λ that
may result from A executing SA and the agents in Agt \A choosing any of their
available actions, ϕ holds in M,λ[1];
M, q  〈〈A〉〉2ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every λ resulting from execution of
SA, ϕ holds in M,λ[i] for every i ≥ 0;
M, q  〈〈A〉〉ϕUψ iff there exist SA and i ≥ 0 such that, for every λ resulting from
execution of SA, ψ holds in M,λ[i] and ϕ holds in M,λ[j] for every 0 ≤ j < i.
Proposition 1 [3] The complexity of the model checking problem for ATL is linear
in the size of the model (i.e., the number of transitions) and the length of the checked
formula.
3 Problems with Strategic Ability under Uncertainty
ATEL [20, 21] enriches the picture with epistemic component, adding to ATL operators
for representing agents’ knowledge: Kaϕ reads as “agent a knows that ϕ”. Additional
operators EAϕ, CAϕ, and DAϕ refer to “everybody knows”, common knowledge, and
distributed knowledge among the agents fromA. Thus, EAϕ means that every agent in
A knows that ϕ holds, while CAϕ means not only that the agents from A know that ϕ,
but they also know that they know that, and know that they know that they know it, etc.
The distributed knowledge modality DAϕ denotes a situation in which, if the agents
could combine their individual knowledge together, they would be able to infer that ϕ
is true.
Models for ATEL extend concurrent game structures with epistemic accessibility re-
lations∼1, ...,∼k⊆ Q×Q (one per agent) for modeling agents’ uncertainty.3 Agent a’s
epistemic relation is meant to encode a’s inability to distinguish between the (global)
system states: q ∼a q′ means that, while the system is in state q, agent a cannot really
determine whether it is in q or q′. Then:
3The relations are assumed to be equivalences.
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M, q  Kaϕ iff ϕ holds for every state q′ such that q ∼a q′.
Relations ∼EA, ∼CA and ∼DA , used to model group epistemics, are derived from the
individual accessibility relations of agents from A. First, ∼EA is the union of relations
∼a, a ∈ A. Next, ∼CA is defined as the transitive closure of ∼EA. Finally, ∼DA is the
intersection of all the ∼a, a ∈ A. The semantics of group knowledge can be defined as
below (for K = C,E,D):
M, q  KAϕ iff ϕ holds for every state q′ such that q ∼KA q′.
One of the main challenges in such a logic is the question how, given an explicit
way to represent agents’ knowledge, this should interfere with the agents’ available
strategies. What does it mean that an agent has a strategy to enforce ϕ, if it involves
making different choices in states that are epistemically indistinguishable for the agent,
for instance? Moreover, agents are assumed some epistemic capabilities when making
decisions, and other for epistemic properties likeKaϕ. The interpretation of knowledge
operators refers to the agents’ capability to distinguish one state from another; the se-
mantics of 〈〈A〉〉 allows the agents to base their decisions upon histories, i.e. sequences
of states. These tensions between complete vs. incomplete information on one hand,
and perfect vs. imperfect recall on the other, has been studied in [8]. It was also ar-
gued that, when reasoning about what an agent can enforce, it seems more appropriate
to require the agent to know his winning strategy rather than to know only that such a
strategy exists. This problem is closely related to the distinction between knowledge de
re and knowledge de dicto, well known in the philosophy of language [17], as well as
research on the interaction between knowledge and action [10, 11, 25]. Two variations
of ATEL were proposed as solutions: ATEL-R* where agents were able to memorize the
whole game by definition, ATOL for agents with (possibly) bounded memory. As agents
seldom have unlimited memory, and logics of strategic ability with incomplete infor-
mation and perfect recall have undecidable model checking [18], we think that ATOL is
more important of the two.
4 The Logic of ATOL
We believe that ATOL captures agents’ strategic abilities under incomplete informa-
tion in an intuitive way (cf. Observation 3). However, the notation chosen for the
logic in [8], and even its name, were rather unfortunate (the name of Alternating-time
Temporal Logic is hard enough to understand; we made it worse by using the term
“observation” in a non-standard way). Here, we would like to present the syntax and
semantics of ATOL in a more understandable form.
4.1 Syntax
The language of ATOL (with respect to a set of agents Agt, and atomic propositions Π)
can be formally defined as the following extension of ATL:
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ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | KAϕ | 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)
gϕ | 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)2ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)ϕUϕ.
where p ∈ Π is a proposition, A,Γ ⊆ Agt are groups of agents, and K refers to
the collective epistemic operators E,C,D. Again, 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)3ϕ can be defined as
〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)>Uϕ, and we can define individual knowledge with Kaϕ ≡ C{a}ϕ. The
informal meaning of 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)ϕ is: “group A has a strategy to enforce ϕ, and agents
Γ can identify the strategy as successful for A in the epistemic sense K”. Only mem-
oryless uniform strategies are considered; we define these notions formally in the next
section.
4.2 Semantics
Formulae of ATOL are interpreted in concurrent epistemic game structures:
M = 〈Agt, Q,Π, pi, Act, d, o,∼1, ...,∼k〉
in which Agt, Q,Π, pi, Act, d, o are inherited from concurrent game structures, and
∼1, ...,∼k are epistemic accessibility relations for agents a1, ..., ak. We require that
agents have the same choices in indiscernible states: for every q, q′ such that q ∼a q′
it is required that da(q) = da(q′). To specify plans, agents use memoryless uniform
strategies.
Definition 1 A memoryless uniform strategy is a function sa : Q→ Act for which:
• sa(q) ∈ da(q) (the strategy specifies available actions), and
• if q ∼a q′ then sa(q) = sa(q′) (strategies specify the same choices for indistin-
guishable states).
As usually, a collective strategy SA assigns every agent a ∈ A with one strategy sa.
When plans under uncertainty are considered, we will be interested in checking if
the goal is satisfied in any subjectively possible course of action that may result from
an execution of such a plan. Note that, in the general case, different agents can be
used to identify and execute the plan. Also, collective agents can identify strategies
in different epistemic senses. For example, 〈〈A〉〉D(Γ)ϕ means that coalition Γ acts as
a “headquarters committee”: if they share their knowledge with each other, they can
prepare a plan for team A to achieve ϕ. A should be able to execute the plan, so it must
be uniform for agents from A.
Definition 2 The set of computations – consistent with strategy SA, and starting from
state q – that are possible from agents Γ’s point of view in epistemic modeK = E,C,D,
can be defined as:
outK(q, SA) = {λ = q0q1q2... | q0 = q ∼
K
Γ λ[0] and for every i = 1, 2, ... there exists
a tuple of agents’ decisions 〈αi−1a1 , ..., αi−1ak 〉 such that αi−1a ∈ da(qi−1) for each
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The semantics of ATOL is defined via the following rules:
M, q  p iff q ∈ pi(p), for an atomic proposition p;
M, q  ¬ϕ iff M, q 2 ϕ;
M, q  ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, q  ϕ and M, q  ψ;
M, q  KAϕ iff M, q′  ϕ for every q′ such that q ∼KA q′.
M, q  〈〈A〉〉K(Γ) gϕ iff there is a collective memoryless uniform strategy SA such
that, for every path λ ∈ outK(q, SA), we have that M,λ[1]  ϕ;
M, q  〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)2ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every λ ∈ outK(q, SA), we have
M,λ[i]  ϕ for every i ≥ 0;
M, q  〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)ϕUψ iff there existSA and i ≥ 0 such that, for everyλ ∈ outK(q, SA),
we have M,λ[i]  ψ and M,λ[j]  ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i.
Remark 2 Since the epistemic relations are required to be equivalences, the epistemic
layer of ATEL and ATOL refers indeed to agents’ knowledge rather than beliefs in gen-
eral. As the assumption is not vital to any results presented here, we suggest that this
requirement can be relieved if necessary, to allow for reasoning about other kinds of
beliefs as well.
Observation 3 Formula 〈〈a〉〉K(a)ϕ specifies that agent a has a strategy de re to enforce
ϕ. In other words, M, q  〈〈a〉〉K(a)ϕ if, and only if, there is an executable strategy sa
for a such that every execution of sa from state q brings about ϕ, and agent a knows
that this is the case. Thus, a can identify sa as the strategy that guarantees ϕ.
Proposition 4 [18, 8] The model checking complexity for ATOL is NP-hard and
∆2-easy in the size of the model and the length of the checked formula. The problem is
NP-hard already in the case when the language includes no epistemic operators, every
formula contains at most one cooperation modality, and the games are turn-based (i.e.,
agents are taking turns one after another).
4.3 A New Semantics for Strategic Ability and Knowledge
So far, we have been discussing results already presented in previous papers. In this
section, we present an alternative semantics for ATOL, which forms the main new con-
tribution of this paper.
One major drawback of ATOL is that it vastly increases the number of modal opera-
tors necessary to express properties of agents. For team A, a whole family of coopera-
tion modalities 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ) is created (in place of a single modality 〈〈A〉〉 in ATL) in order
to specify who should identify the right strategy for A, in what way etc. It would be
much more elegant to modify the semantics of “simple” cooperation modalities 〈〈A〉〉
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and/or epistemic operators, so that they can be composed into sufficiently expressive
formulae. The problem with strategic ability under uncertainty is that, when analyzing
consequences of their strategies, agents must consider also the outcome paths starting
from states other than the current state – namely, all states that look the same as the cur-
rent state for them. Thus, a property of a strategy being successful with respect to goal
ϕ is not local to the current state; the same strategy must be successful in all “opening”
states being considered. In order to capture this characteristics of strategic ability under
incomplete information, we slightly change the type of the satisfaction relation , and
define what it means for a formula ϕ to be satisfied in a set of states R ⊆ Q of model
M .
The language is now exactly the same as the one of ATEL [20, 21]:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | KAϕ | 〈〈A〉〉 gϕ | 〈〈A〉〉2ϕ | 〈〈A〉〉ϕUϕ.
The models are concurrent epistemic game structures again and, like in the previous
section, we consider only memoryless uniform strategies. The set of outcome paths of
strategy SA, starting from the “opening” states R, is defined as:
out(R,SA) = {λ = q0q1q2... | q0 ∈ R and for every i = 1, 2, ... there exists a tuple
of agents’ decisions 〈αi−1a1 , ..., α
i−1
ak
〉 such that αi−1a ∈ da(qi−1) for each a ∈ A,




Let img(q,∼) be the image of state q with respect to relation ∼, i.e. the set of all
states q′ such that q ∼ q′. The new semantics is given through the following clauses:
M,R  p iff q ∈ pi(p) for every q ∈ R;
M,R  ¬ϕ iff not M,R  ϕ;
M,R  ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,R  ϕ and M,R  ψ;





M,R  〈〈A〉〉 gϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every λ ∈ out(R,SA), we have
that M, {λ[1]}  ϕ;
M,R  〈〈A〉〉2ϕ iff there exists SA such that, for every λ ∈ out(R,SA), we have that
M, {λ[i]}  ϕ for every i ≥ 0;
M,R  〈〈A〉〉ϕUψ iff there exist SA and i ≥ 0 such that, for every λ ∈ out(R,SA),
we have that M, {λ[i]}  ψ and M, {λ[j]}  ϕ for every 0 ≤ j < i.
We will writeM, q  ϕ as the shorthand forM, {q}  ϕ. Note that the interpretation
of epistemic operators is slightly non-standard: M, q  Kaϕ expresses the fact that ϕ
holds for all states indiscernible from q, instead of stating that ϕ holds for every one
state separately. This makes an important difference when ϕ requires a single global
evidence for all the states from img(q,∼a) together (like in the case of ϕ ≡ 〈〈A〉〉ψ).
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Let 1 represent the satisfaction relation according to the semantic rules from Sec-
tion 4, and 2 the satisfaction relation according to the new semantics presented here.
The following propositions establish the relationship between the former and the latter
version of ATOL.
Proposition 5 The new semantics is expressive enough to capture the strategic ability
from the original semantics of ATOL: M, q 1 〈〈A〉〉K(Γ)ϕ if, and only if, M, q 2
KΓ〈〈A〉〉ϕ.
Proposition 6 The new semantics enables expressing properties that cannot be ex-
pressed in the original ATOL. For example, formula KaKb〈〈A〉〉ϕ is not expressible
in the original version of ATOL for most models.
Proposition 7 Model checking is NP-hard and ∆2-easy also for this new version of
ATOL.
5 Conclusions
The logic of ATOL was designed to capture strategic abilities of agents under incom-
plete information, and deal with some problems revealed by previous attempts. In this
paper, we re-define ATOL, using an easier-to-read notation, and more natural terminol-
ogy. More importantly, we propose an alternative “take” on ATOL, in which simple
cooperation modalities 〈〈A〉〉 can be combined with epistemic operators into sufficiently
expressive formulae. This new version of ATOL is no less expressive than the older
version, while retaining the same complexity of model checking.
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